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t;UMMt:NTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
and the case was argued on February 20. (See Tax Notes, 
Feb. 26, 2001, p. 1151.) 
This old-fashioned issue will therefore have another 
day in the sun, but none of this should have happened. 
With the Federal Circuit deciding as it did and with a 
number of federal judges claiming an exemption from 
a tax of general application (a rather unseemly position 
for judges to tcike publicly), it's understandable the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. But neither the 
original understanding nor any other plausible reading 
of the Compensation Clause supports an absolute tax 
exemption for federal judges, and Evans v. Gore, the 
case on which the Federal Circuit relied in Hatter, was 
effectively overruled in 1939.5 Originalists and non-
originalists should be able to agree: The purposes of 
the Compensation Clause aren't implicated in Hatter. 
I 
This old-fashioned issue will have 
another day in the sun, but none of 
this should have happened. 
The Compensation Clause was part of the constitu-
tional structure designed to protect the judiciary 
against interference from other governmental 
branches, particularly Congress. The concern was judi-
cial independence, not preserving the after-tax incomes 
of federal judges. It's certainly true that a tax directed 
at specific judges would violate the Compensation 
Clause, and it's probably true that a tax directed only 
at the judiciary would violate the clause. For that mat-
ter, it might even be the case that a facially neutral 
statute motivated by a congressional intent to influence 
the judiciary would fail constitutional requirements.6 
But those interesting hypotheticals have nothing to do 
with Hatter. Requiring that federal judges be subject to 
the same taxing scheme applicable to other Americans 
shouldn't affect judicial independence at all. 
In this article, we examine the merits of the dispute 
in Hatter. After a brief description of the specifics of 
the case, we discuss two areas that should affect 
Hatter's resolution: the original understanding of the 
Compensation Clause and the 20th century 
jurisprudence on the relationship between the clause 
and the taxing power. Both suggest- clearly, we think 
- that the Federal Circuit's decision should be 
reversed. Along the way we also discuss some 19th 
century misunderstandings of the Compensation 
Clause. 
I. Hatter 
The controversies in Hatter are beginning to strain 
the capacities of law libraries and electronic databases. 
Eight opinions have been issued so far/ and more 
words are on the way. Much of the case's procedural 
5See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939); infra Part 
IV. C. 
6That's an issue the Supreme Court hasn't yet had tore-
solve. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 n.30 (1980). 
7See supra note 3. 
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history is complex - raising questions such as who 
can hear the case,8 and the implications of the Supreme • 
Court's inability to muster a quorum when the case 
was brought there at an earlier stage9 - but the fun-
damental, substantive issue is straightforward: Under 
the Compensation Clause, can Congress extend anal-
ready existing tax of general application to sitting 
judges who had previously been exempt from the tax? 
The controversies in Hatter are 
beginning to strain the capacities of 
law libraries and electronic databases. 
Eight opinions have been issued so 
far, and more words are on the way. 
Judge Terry Hatter and several other federal judges 
sued in 1989, challenging the application to them of the 
wage taxes that fund the social security old-age, sur-
vivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) program and 
the Medicare hospital insurance program. Before 1983, 
most federal employees, including judges, were ex-
empt from social security taxes because of the separate 
retirement systems established by the federal govern-
ment on their behalf. But the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
8 At least 10 suits involving almost 100 other federal judges 
with similar claims are in the pipeline. See Petition for Cer-
tiorari, App. L, United States v. Hatter (No. 99-1978). No mem-
bers of the Supreme Court have been parties to Hatter or any 
of the other cases. See id.; Linda Greenhouse, "Supreme Court 
Roundup: Court to Review Benefits Tax on U.S. Judges," N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 17, 2000, at A29. 
9Four justices recused themselves when the case reached 
the Court in 1996, see 519 U.S. 801 (1996), apparently because 
they might have been "entitled to refunds if the plaintiffs' 
broadest remedial theory prevail[ed]." Greenhouse, supra 
note 8 (noting that only two justices are not participating in 
this round, presumably because the passage of time leaves 
them as the only members of the Court with a potential 
financial stake in the outcome). Because of the four recusals 
last time, the Court lacked a quorum of six participating 
members. See 28 U.S.C. section L The absence of a quorum 
had the effect of affirming, as if by an equally divided Court, 
the Federal Circuit's 1995 ruling (64 F.3d 647) that the exten-
sion of social security taxes to incumbent Article III judges 
violated the Compensation Clause. See 28 U.S.C. section 2109. 
Although an affirmance by an equally divided Court has no 
precedential significance, such a disposition is said to be 
"conclusive and binding" on the parties. See United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 107, 113 (1868). The Court's 1996 disposition might 
therefore represent the law of the case in Hatter. On the other 
hand, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies "only with respect 
to issues previously determined," Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 
332, 347 n.18 (1979), and the 1996 order under section 2109 
was not an adjudication of the merits that would trigger that 
doctrine. Cf Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 
U.S. 363, 365 n.1 (1973) (finding that an earlier dismissal of 
certiorari as improvidently granted was not the law of the 
case); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) (refusing to treat 
the prior affirmance of a state conviction by an equally 
divided Court as precluding the defendant from raising a 
federal habeas corpus claim). 
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Responsibility Act of 1982 subjected federal judges to 
the Medicare tax, 10 and the Sodal Security Amend-
ments 6f 1983 imposed the OASDI wage tax on the 
judges.11 Hatter and the otherjudges party to the suit 
were already on the bench when the wage taxes became 
effective - hence the claim that their compensation 
was being unconstitutionally diminished. 
The suit focuses on the effect of the social security 
taxes on federal judges, but the statutory changes 
didn't single out the judges for any special, deleterious 
treatment. Congress was trying to increase revenue for 
the social security system, and the changes also im-
posed the wage taxes for the first time on many other 
federal officials, including the president, the vice presi-
dent, cabinet members, and members of Congress. The 
statutory changes thus weren't aimed at the judiciary 
and, at bottom, the changes merely required treating 
most government officials in the same way other 
American citizens had been treated for decades. As 
we'll demonstrate, that should make every difference 
in the world in Hatter. 
II. Original Understanding 
The Compensation Clause isn't mysterious. It's clear 
from the founding debates that the clause was intended 
to help protect federal judges from external pressures, 
particularly from Congress and the president, that 
might keep them from acting impartially. As the 
Supreme Court wrote in 1980, 
The Compensation Clause has its roots in the 
longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an in-
dependent Judiciary. A Judiciary free from control 
by the Executive and Legislature is essential if 
there is a right to have claims decided by judges 
who are free from potential domination by other 
branches of government.12 
The founders debated whether the clause went far 
enough or whether it went too far, but there was no 
disagreement about its purpose. That understanding 
of the Compensation Clause should make Hatter an 
easy case. If a taxing statute imposes no pressure on 
the judiciary qua judiciary or on individual judges, its 
application shouldn't be limited by the Compensation 
Clause. 
The founders realized that life tenure, while a criti-
cal element in protecting judicial independence, wasn't 
enough by itself. A guaranteed job wouldn't mean 
much if a judge's compensation could be tied to the 
content of his decisions. As Justice Story put it in 1833, 
"Without [the Compensation Clause], the other [provi-
sion], as to the tenure of office, would have been utterly 
nugatory, and indeed a mere mockery."13 How impar-
10Pub. L. No. 97-248, Tit. II, Subtit. E, Pt. III, section 278, 96 
Stat. 324, 559-63 (amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121). 
11Pub. L. No. 98-21, section 101(b)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 69 
(amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121). 
12United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980). 
13Jos~ph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States section 844, at 602 (Ronald D. Rotunda and John 
E. Novak eds., 1987) (1833). 
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tial would a judge be if he knew that Congress might 
adjust his salary downward when he didn't decide 
cases in the congressionally desired way or that Con-
gress might give him a bonus when he acted as 
desired? Alexander Hamilton explained in the first sen-
tence of The Federalist No. 79, "Next to permanency in 
office, nothing can contribute more to the inde-
pendence of the judges than a fixed provision for their 
support."14 
This wasn't a hypothetical concern for the founders. 
The Declaration of Independence condemned King 
George because he had "made Judges dependent on 
his Will alone; for the Tenure of their Offices, and the 
Amount and Payment of their Salaries."15 That history 
pointed to the importance of both life tenure and the 
Compensation Clause in protecting judges from the 
sovereign's commands. 
In 1787, the King was out of the picture, of course, 
but the fundamental issue hadn't changed. As 
Alexander Hamilton noted in 1802, "From the injunc-
tion, that the compensation of the Judges shall not be 
diminished, it is manifest that the Constitution intends 
to guard the independence of those Officers against the 
Legislative Department: Because, to this department 
alone would have belonged the power of diminishing 
· their compensations."16 
The Compensation Clause isn't 
mysterious. It's clear from the 
founding debates that the clause was 
intended to help protect federal judges 
from external pressures that might 
keep them from acting impartially. 
That passage from Hamilton restates what everyone 
was saying about the purpose of the Compensation 
Clause at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and 
during the later ratification debates. Two questions 
were discussed in the founding debates: whether judi-
cial compensation should be absolutely fixed for any 
sitting judge so as to protect his independence, and (an 
Anti-Federalist concern) whether the clause helped 
give too much independence to federal judges. We'll 
now discuss those two questions, with the goal of dem-
onstrating that no one at the time of the founding had 
any doubt about the purpose of the clause. 
A. The Permissibility of Raises in Compensation 
Some founders thought the Compensation Clause 
didn't go far enough to protect judicial impartiality. 
James Madison, for a very important example, wanted 
14The Federalist No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
15Some of the history of this issue, including English an-
tecedents to the Compensation Clause, can be found in United 
States v. Wilt 449 U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980). 
16 Alexander Hamilton, The Examination, No. 12 (Feb. 23, 
1802), reprinted in 4 The Founders' Constitution 175, 175 (Philip 
B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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to make sure Congress couldn't change a judge's com-
pensation at all. Indeed, the resolution that was the 
basis for the first debate on judicial compensation at 
the Constitutional Convention, a resolution introduced 
by Edmund Randolph of Virginia and sponsored by 
the Virginia delegation, including Madison, provided 
that the National Judiciary should "receive punctually 
at stated times fixed compensation for their services, 
in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as 
to affect the persons actually in office at the time of 
such increase or diminution."17 That is, all adjustments 
in compensation, upward as well as downward, would 
have been forbidden for any sitting judge. 
When this provision of the Virginia plan was first 
debated at the Convention, on July 11, Gouverneur 
Morris (representing Pennsylvania) moved that the 
words "or increase" should be struck because "the 
Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as 
circumstances might require, and ... this would not 
create any improper dependence in the Judges," 18 Benjamin 
Franklin agreed that increases in compensation should 
be permitted: "Money may not only become plentier, 
but the business of the [judicial] department may in-
crease as the Country becomes more populous."19 
Avoiding "improper dependence" was the univer-
sally acknowledged goal. Madison understood that 
preventing a reduction in compensation was more im-
portant than preventing an increase, but he was still 
bothered by the prospect of judges interested in higher 
compensation trying to curry favor with Congress 
through their decisions: 
The dependence will be less if the increase alone 
should be permitted, but it will be improper even 
so far to permit a dependence. Whenever an in-
crease is wished by the Judges, or may be in agita-
tion in the legislature, an undue complaisance in 
the former may be felt towards the latter. If at 
such a crisis there should be in Court suits to 
which leading members of the Legislature may 
be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which 
ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented.20 
But there was an obvious practical problem with 
capping compensation. Inflation could erode the eco-
nomic position of sitting judges, and good judges 
might therefore leave for greener pastures. Life tenure 
isn't a protection if no one can afford to serve for long.21 
171 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21-22 
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (May 29, 1787) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
182 id. at 44 (July 18, 1787) (emphasis added). If Madison 
reported the language of the resolution correctly, the motion 
should have been to delete "increase or," but nothing in our 
argument turns on the placement of the "or." 
19Id. at 44-45. 
20Id. at 45. 
21The president's situation is different. While his compen-
sation "shall neither be increased nor diminished during the 
period for which he shall have been elected," U.S. Const. art. 
II, section 1, cl. 7, the presidency wasn't expected to be a 
lifetime position and in any event had a fixed term. See id. 
cl. 1; The Federalist No. 79, supra note 14, at 473. 
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Rather than setting compensation at a specific dollar 
figure, Madison therefore suggested, why not tie fixed \. 
compensation to some always valuable commodity? 
He proposed that "[t]he variations in the value of 
money, may be guarded [against] by taking for a stan-
dard wheat or some other thing of permanent value."22 
Linking judicial compensation to wheat is an inter-
esting idea, but Gouverneur Morris pointed out the 
difficulty: 
The value of money may not only alter but the 
State of Society may alter. In this event the same 
quantity of wheat, the same value would not be 
the same compensation. The Amount of salaries 
must always be regulated by the manners & the 
style of living in a Country.23 
Morris prevailed on this point, and the prohibition 
against any "increase" was struck from the draft Clause 
by a substantial vote. 
Madison didn't give up. In late August, he and 
James McHenry of Maryland tried to reinstate the pro-
hibition against increases in judicial compensation, 
and, after Morris repeated how unlikely it was that any 
particular asset would maintain a constant value as 
conditions changed, George Mason spoke in favor of 
the Madison-McHenry motion. Maybe new judges will 
have to be paid more if the country is going to maintain 
a quality judiciary, but that doesn't mean sitting judges 
should be entitled to more: "There was no weight ... 
in the argument drawn from changes in the value of 
the metals, because this might be provided for by an 
increase of salaries so made as not to affect persons in 
office, and this was the only argument on which much 
stress seemed to have been laid."24 
Madison and his supporters lost again. General 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina 
responded to Mason, questioning the desirability of a 
multi-tiered compensation system, particularly if the 
more senior judges were likely to be paid less: 
The importance of the Judiciary will require men 
of the first talents; large salaries will therefore be 
necessary, larger than the U.S. can allow in the 
first instance. He was not satisfied with the ex-
pedient mentioned by Col. Mason. He did not 
think it would have a good effect or a good ap-
pearance, for new Judges to come in with higher 
salaries than old ones.25 
Gouverneur Morris added that a prohibition on in-
creases for sitting judges would be easy to circumvent: 
"[T]he expedient might be evaded & therefore 
amounted to nothing. Judges might resign, & then be 
re-appointed to increased salaries."26 The Madison-
McHenry motion was defeated, as was another motion 
made by Madison and Randolph that would have 
added the following words to the Compensation 
222 Farrand, supra note 17, at 45 (July 18, 1787). 
23Id. 
24Id. at 429 (Aug. 27, 1787). 
25Id. at 429-30. 
26Id. at 430. 
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Clause: "nor increased by any Act of the Legislature 
which shall operate before the expiration of three years 
after the passing thereof."27 
Throughout these debates at the Convention no one 
questioned that the goal of the Compensation Clause 
was to protect judicial impartiality. The founders knew 
that, while their solutions to the problem were imper-
fect, they were a lot better than nothing. The most 
extensive discussion of the Compensation Clause in its 
final form is found in Hamilton's The Federalist No. 79. 
Hamilton explained why a fixed salary wouldn't work, 
if the country was going to keep good people in office, 28 
but it was still necessary to have "restrictions as to put 
it out of the power of that body [Congress] to change 
the condition of the individual for the worse. A man 
may then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, 
and can never be deterred from his duty by the ap-
prehension of being placed in a less eligible situa-
tion."29 Congress shouldn't be able even to contemplate 
a reduction in the compensation of individual judges. 
The threat of such a reduction might deter a judge from 
his duty, and a "power over a man's subsistence amounts 
to a power over his will."30 If such a threat isn't involved, 
however, the Compensation Clause ought to be ir-
relevant. 
B. The Fear of Excessive Judicial Independence 
The Anti-Federalists raised a different question 
about the Compensation Clause and the other provi-
sions protecting judicial impartiality. Unlike James 
Madison, they worried that the Constitution provided 
too much independence for the judiciary. For example, 
Anti-Federalist "Brutus" complained in 1788 that 
"[t]hey have made the judges independent, in the {ullest 
sense of the word. There is no power above them, to 
controul any of their decisions. There is no authority 
that can remove them, and they cannot be controuled 
by the laws of the legislature."31 
Another Anti-Federalist, known as the "Federal 
Farmer," while more restrained than Brutus, also con-
cluded the Convention had gone overboard. The 
Clause prevented the legislature from taking the sen-
sible step of reducing judicial salaries across the board 
should economic conditions warrant: 
The same judge may frequently be in office thirty 
or forty years; there may often be times, as in 
27Jd. 
28
"It will readily be understood, that the fluctuations in 
the value of money and in the state of society rendered a 
fixed rate of compensation in the constitution inadmissible. 
What might be extravagant today, might in half a century 
become penurious and inadequate." The Federalist No. 79, 
supra note 14, at 473. 
29Jd. 
30ld. at 472; see also id. at 473 ("The salaries of judicial 
offices may from time to time be altered, as occasion shall 
require, yet never so as to lessen the allowance with which 
any particular judge comes into office, in respect of him."). 
31Essay of Brutus, No. 15 (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 The 
Complete Anti-Federalist 437, 438-39 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 
1981). 
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cases of war, or very high prices, when his salary 
may reasonably be increased one half or more; in 
a few years money may become scarce again, and 
prices fall, and his salary, with equal reason and 
propriety be decreased and lowered: not to suffer 
this to be done by consent of all the branches of 
the legislature, is, I believe, quite a novelty in the 
affairs of government. 32 
These Anti-Federalist concerns weren't reflected in 
the final version of the Compensation Clause. But even 
the most ardent Anti-Federalists supported the 
proposition that the judiciary should be protected at 
least to some extent,33 and the real danger- the danger 
that a well-crafted Compensation Clause should 
protect against- was legislative and executive action 
directed specifically at the judiciary. 
C. The Founding and Taxation 
Of course there's nothing in the founding debates 
about the relationship between income taxes and the 
Compensation Clause because there was no original 
understanding that anyone's income or wages might be 
taxed.34 Accordingly, we can't say for sure what the 
founders would have thought about taxing the income 
or wages of federal judges. But we have a pretty good 
idea. It's hard to see how a tax that reaches everyone's 
income, including that of judges, would have raised 
any serious concern about judicial independence. 
There's nothing in the founding debates to suggest 
federal judges were to be exempt from the taxes that 
the founders did expect to be imposed, such as duties 
on imports.35 And the national direct taxes on real es-
32Letter No. 15 from the Federal Farmer to the Republican 
(Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 Storing, supra note 31, at 315, 
318-19. 
33For example, Brutus approvingly referred to the British 
practice of having "fixed salaries" for judges. Essay of 
Brutus, No. 15, supra note 31, at 438. · 
34The Articles of Confederation had effectively given the 
central government no revenue power, other than requisi-
tioning funds from the states. See Erik M. Jensen and 
Jonathan L. Entin, "Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, 
and the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States 
Revisited," 15 Canst. Comm. 353 (1998). In these circum-
stances, merely permitting the government to levy duties on 
imports was such a major increase in the national taxing 
power that a tax on income was almost unimaginable. 
In any event, if an income tax had been imagined, it would 
have been understood to be subject to the direct-tax appor-
tionment rule, U.S. Const. art. I, section 2, cl. 3; art. I, section 
9, cl. 4 - or so one of us believes. In Jensen's view, the 
Supreme Court was right in 1895 when it struck down an 
income tax on the ground that it was a direct tax that hadn't 
been properly apportioned among the states on the basis of 
population. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429 
(1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See Erik M. Jensen, "The Appor-
tionment of 'Direct' Taxes: Are Consumption Taxes Constitu-
tional?" 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334, 2366-75 (1997). 
35The founders thought the burden of such indirect taxes 
would be borne by purchasers. See Jensen, supra note 34, at 
2393-97. As far as we know, no one thought a judge purchas-
ing imported goods should be immune from the effects of an 
impost. 
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tate that were enacted beginning in 1798- and appor-
tioned to meet the requirements of the direct-tax 
clauses of the Constitution36 - contained no exemp-
tions for federal judges, even though such a tax would 
obviously have "diminished" the economic position of 
any judge subject to the tax.37 
III. Nineteenth Century Variations 
Some 19th century developments don't reflect this 
understanding of the Compensation Clause; they show 
confusion about the purposes of the clause. There was 
some sentiment that the clause limited Congress's 
power to tax the income of federal judges, but the 
question was never specifically ruled on by any court. 
When Congress enacted the Civil War income tax, 38 
Chief Justice Taney protested to the Secretary of the 
Treasury against applying the tax to judges: "The act 
in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compen-
sation of every judge three per cent, and if it can be 
diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may 
in the same way be reduced from time to time at the 
pleasure of the legislature. " 39 
Taney conceded the impropriety of litigating his ob-
jections to the tax,40 but his position received a sym-
pathetic response soon afterward. In 1869, Attorney 
General Hoar issued an opinion stating that a tax on 
judicial salaries would violate the Compensation 
36See U.S. Const. art. I, section 2, cl. 3; art. I, section 9, cl. 4; 
see also Jensen, supra note 34, at 2355-56 (discussing direct 
taxes on real estate enacted between 1798 and 1861). 
37See, e.g., Act ofJuly 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597. Of course, 
the measure of such a tax wouldn't have been "compensa-
tion," as we generally understand the term. But if the concern 
under the Compensation Clause is only whether a judge is 
hurt economically by a new tax - and that has to be the 
argument at the foundation of Judge Hatter's case -why 
should we care whether $100 in taxes is paid pursuant to 
something called an income tax or something called a proper-
ty tax? 
38 A 3 percent tax was initially applied to "all salaries of 
officers, or payments to persons in the ... service of the 
United States," Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, section 86, 12 Stat. 
432, 472, which was interpreted to include the president and 
the judiciary. 
39Letter from R.B. Taney to Hon. S.P. Chase (Feb. 16, 1863), 
reprinted in 157 U.S. 701, 701 (1895). At Taney's request, this 
letter was made part of the Court's records by an order dated 
March 10, 1863, see id., but was not published for another 32 
years. The letter appears in the same volume of the U.S. 
Reports that contairu? tne first decision in the Income Tax Cases, 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). We 
don't know whether this was coincidental. 
40 See 157 U.S. at 702 (observing that "all of the judges of 
the courts of the United States have an interest in the ques-
tion, and could not therefore with propriety undertake to 
hear and decide it"). Twentieth century judges have been less 
reluctant to entertain Compensation Clause claims by their 
brethren even in situations where they have a financial stake 
in the outcome. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 
211-17 (1980) (invoking the Rule of Necessity). 
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Clause. 41 Four years later, the government refunded the 
taxes paid by federal judges.42 Justice Field, too, sub- {, 
sequently questioned the validity of taxing judges' -
salaries.43 
Despite Taney's self-serving claim that the indirect 
effects of an income tax on judicial salaries might create 
"the suspicion of [undue] influence"44 - a claim un-
derlying the other objections as well- it's hard to see 
how those suspicions could have developed or why the 
judges deserved a refund. The Civil War income tax 
didn't fall only, or primarily, on judges. Where's the 
possible influence on the judiciary? 
IV. Twentieth Century Jurisprudence 
We've demonstrated, to our satisfaction at least, that 
the original understanding of the Compensation 
Clause doesn't preclude imposing a tax of general ap-
plication on sitting federal judges. And we're equally 
convinced that Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
Compensation Clause, despite the 19th century diver-
sions and another false start in 1920, supports the same 
conclusion. Yes, Evans v. Gore45 (1920} and Miles v. 
Graham46 (1925), if they remained good law, would 
preclude the taxes at issue in Hatter. But those cases 
aren't good law; they aren't even close. They 
misinterpreted the Compensation Clause, and the 
Court in 1939, in O'Malley v. Woodrough,47 gutted both 
cases. Moreover, while the Court in United States v. 
Will,48 decided in 1980, vigorously applied the Com-
pensation Clause to strike down the retroactive repeal 
of judicial cost-of-living increases (one of which had 
been in place for only a few hours), that case in no way 
revives the properly discredited understanding of 
Evans. 
If there's nothing left of Evans v. Gore, there's noth-
ing to Judge Hatter's case. We think Evans was wrongly 
4113 Op. Att'y Gen. 161 (1869). But a 1919 opinion by At-
torney General Palmer found the objections to such taxes 
unpersuasive after a more thorough review than Hoar had 
undertaken. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 475 (1919). The Supreme 
Court nonetheless reaffirmed Attorney General Hoar's 
opinion the following year. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 
258-59 (1920). 
42See Wayne v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 274, 290 (1891). The 
Wayne court noted "the general acquiescence of the profes-
sion" in the impropriety of taxing judges, id., but didn't 
address the constitutionality of the practice. Instead, the case 
concerned a claim by the estate of Justice Wayne to recover 
the amount owed him after his refund warrant was stolen 
before delivery. See id. at 275-76. 
43Field concurred in the invalidation of the 1894 income 
tax, pointing to the application of the tax to federal judges 
as one of many reasons why he thought the tax had to fall. 
See Pollock v. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 604-06 
(1895). 
44157 U.S. at 702. It's self-serving in that it supports ex-
emption from tax. It's hardly self-serving in the image it 
presents of the judiciary. 
45253 u.s. 245 (1920). 
46268 u.s. 501 (1925). 
47307 u.s. 277 (1939). 
48449 u.s. 200 (1980). 
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decided to begin with- it was inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Compensation Clause- but, even if 
we're wrong about that, we'll run through the cases to 
demonstrate why Evans hasn't withstood the test of 
time. 
A. Evans v. Gore 
In the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax 
statute, the compensation of federal judges was ex-
empted from the tax.49 In general, Congress, feeling its 
way slowly because the boundaries of the Amendment 
were unclear, drafted the Income Tax Law of 1913 con-
servatively, not seeking to tax many items that might 
have been within congressional power. 50 
Yes, Evans v. Gore and Miles v. 
Graham, if they remained good law, 
would preclude the taxes at issue in 
Hatter. But those cases aren't good 
law; th~y aren't even close. 
Wartime revenue needs overcame congressional 
conservatism, however, and, in the Revenue Act of 
1918, Congress extended the tax base, "including in the 
case of the President of the United States [and] the 
judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United 
States ... the compensation received as such. "51 A 
federal judge appointed to the bench in 1899, long 
before the effective date of the Act - and, for that 
matter, long before the Sixteenth Amendment began its 
move through the state legislatures in 1909 - chal-
lenged the application of the Revenue Act to him, cul-
minating in the Supreme Court's 1920 decision in Evans 
v. Gore.52 
The Supreme Court concluded the tax was invalid 
under the Compensation Clause. Despite a dissent 
49See Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, section II.B., 38 Stat. 
114, 168 ("in computing net income under this section there 
shall be excluded ... the compensation ... of the judges of the 
supreme and inferior courts of the United States now in of-
fice"). 
50 After the Supreme Court had rejected the 1894 income 
tax as a direct tax that hadn't been properly apportioned 
among the states on the basis of population, the Sixteenth 
Amendment removed "taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived," from the apportionment requirement. U.S. 
Const. amend. XVI. But the early post-Amendment Congres-
ses generally took a restrained view of what could be in-
cluded in "income." For example, Congress didn't try to tax 
dividends representing the distribution of pre-1913 corporate 
earnings, although the Supreme Court later suggested that 
would have been within congressional power. See Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 204 (1920). And Congress didn't try 
to tax appreciation in the value of property from the pre-1913 
period, even if the realization of the appreciation occurred 
after ratification ofthe Amendment. See Revenue Act of 1918, 
ch. 18, section 202(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (providing that 
basis of "property acquired before March 1, 1913, [would be] 
the fair market value of such property as of that date"). 
51Ch. ,18, section 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065. 
52253 u.s. 245 (1920). 
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from Justice Holmes,53 the majority opinion, written by 
Justice Van Devanter, reads as if this case were a no-
brainer. The opinion is striking in its failure to examine 
the purposes of the Compensation Clause, except at the 
most abstract level. No diminution in compensation 
means no income tax, regardless of whether the tax 
reaches other government officials, regardless of 
whether it's a tax that applies generally. At no point 
did the Court make a serious effort to explain what the 
danger to the judiciary was from a tax of general ap-
plication. The Court quoted extensively from many of 
the usual suspects concerning judicial independence, 
but never tied that discussion to the particulars of the 
case before it. 54 
B. Miles v. Graham 
In Evans, the Court hadn't seemed to rely on the fact 
that the judge was already sitting when the Revenue 
Act of 1918 went into effect, but some suggested that 
fact might have been crucial to the result. If a judge 
assumes office after a tax is already on the books- so 
that he can do the calculations about his future eco-
nomic position taking the tax into account - what 
possible claim is there that his compensation has been 
diminished by the tax?55 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court, in 1925, in Miles v. Graham,56 concluded that such 
a judge was also protected from federal income taxa-
tion. 
Judge Graham's appointment was effective Septem-
ber 1, 1919, after the Revenue Act of 1918 was in place. 
So, asked Justice McReynolds, "[d]oes the circumstance 
that [Graham's] appointment came after the taxing act 
53Holmes thought the tax would have been valid anyway, 
see id. at 265 (Holmes, J., dissenting), but he also suggested 
that the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment should have 
removed all doubt, by permitting an unapportioned tax on 
incomes "from whatever source derived." Id. at 267. We doubt 
the significance of Holmes's alternative argument. As Justice 
Van Devanter pointed out in the majority opinion, there's 
substantial evidence that the Amendment wasn't intended to 
overturn preexisting immunities from taxation. New York 
Governor Charles Evans Hughes raised such a question, in 
initially resisting his state's ratification of the Amendment, 
because he feared the Amendment might have overturned the 
understanding that state and local bond interest couldn't be 
reached by an unapportioned income tax. But the Evans Court 
noted that Hughes's concern "promptly brought forth from 
statesmen who participated in proposing the Amendment 
such convincing expositions of its purpose ... that the ap-
prehension was effectively dispelled and ratification fol-
lowed." Id. at 261. Such interest can be taxed today because 
of a change in intergovernmental immunity law, not because 
the Court has changed its view of what the Amendment did: 
"[If the Amendment] had frozen into the Constitution all the 
tax immunities that existed in 1913, then most of inter-
governmental tax immunity doctrine would be invalid." South 
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522 n.12 (1988); Nevertheless, 
"[t]he legislative history ... shows that ... the sole purpose of 
[the Amendment] was to remove the apportionment require-
ment for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable." Id. 
54See Evans, 253 U.S. at 249-53. 
55See 1 Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxa-
tion of Income, Estates, and Gifts para. 1.2.7 (3d ed. 1999). 
56268 u.s. 501 (1925). 
1547 
COMMENTARY /SPECIAL REPORT 
require a different view concerning his right to exemp-
tion?"57 The answer (for all but dissenting Justice Bran-
deis) was No: 
The words and history of the clause indicate that 
the purpose was to impose upon Congress the 
duty definitely to declare what sum shall be 
received by each judge out of the public funds 
and the times for payment. When this duty has 
been complied with, the amount specified be-
come the compensation which is protected 
against diminution during his continuance in of-
fice. 58 
The applicable statute said Judge Graham should be 
paid $7,500 and that, said Justice McReynolds, was 
that. 
C. O'Malley v. Woodrough 
In 1939, the Court revisited the Compensation 
Clause in O'Malley v. Woodrough. 59 In the Revenue Act 
of 1932, Congress had provided that the statutory term 
"gross income" would include compensation of 
"judges of courts of the United States taking office after 
June 6, 1932."60 Judge Woodrough, fitting within that 
defined category, brought suit, reasonably arguing 
that, under Miles v. Graham, the tax couldn't be applied 
to federal judges. 
I The difference between the Court's analysis in 1939 and the two cases from the 1920s is the difference between night and day. 
The difference between the Court's analysis in 1939 
and the two cases frmn the 1920s is the difference be-
tween night and day. Justice Frankfurter reexamined 
the Compensation Clause and concluded that the tax 
at issue didn't affect judicial independence, which is 
what the clause is all about. Moreover, it obviously 
irritated the Court that Judge Woodrough was seeking 
to avoid the civic obligations of ordinary citizens; 
judges ought to pay their share of the costs of civiliza-
tion. Some samples from the Frankfurter opinion sug-
gest its scope: 
The meaning which Evans v. Gore imputed to the 
history which explains Article III, section 1 was 
contrary to the way in which it was read by other 
English-speaking courts. 61 
To suggest that [the tax] makes inroads upon the 
independence of judges who took office after 
57Id. at 508. 
58Id. at 508-09. 
59307 u.s. 277 (1939). 
6
°Ch. 209, section 22(a), 47 Stat. 169, 178, reenacted by Reve-
nue Act of 1936, ch. 690, section 22(a), 49 Stat. 1648, 1657. It 
wasn't until1954 that statutory provisions specifically taxing 
judicial salaries were eliminated as surplusage. See S. Rep. 
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954); 1 Bittker and Lok-
ken, supra note 55, para. 1.2.7. 
61 0'Malley, 307 U.S. at 281. 
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Congress had thus charged them with the com-
mon duties of citizenship, by making them bear 
their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the 
Government, is to trivia:lize the great historic ex-
perience on which the framers based the safe-
guards of Article III, section 1.62 
To subject them to a general tax is merely to recog-
nize that judges are also citizens, and that their 
particular function in government does not 
generate an immunity from sharing with their 
fellow citizens the material burden of the govern-
ment whose Constitution and laws they are 
charged with administering.63 
To be sure, one sentence quoted above alludes to the 
fact that Judge Woodrough was appointed after the tax 
was extended to members of the judiciary, but a fair 
reading of Justice Frankfurter's opinion shows that this 
statement merely reflects the particular details of the 
lawsuit. Nothing in O'Malley supports a constitutional 
distinction between incumbent judges and new judges 
for tax purposes. Justice Frankfurter began his discus-
sion with the first quotation, which strongly con-
demned the approach taken in Evans v. Gore, and the 
rest of his analysis applies to all judges -whenever 
they were appointed. 
The reasoning in O'Malley is totally inconsistent 
with that in Evans and Miles. Nevertheless, Justice 
Frankfurter said nothing directly about the continuing 
vitality of Evans, and he couldn't even bring himself to 
say that Miles had been entirely overturned. 
Frankfurter wrote only that "to the extent that what 
the Court now says is inconsistent with what was said 
in Miles v. Graham, the latter cannot survive."64 Miles 
was clearly rejected in its entirety, however, and 
Frankfurter's logic cannot be limited to that decision. 
Because Miles rested exclusively on Evans, the repudia-
tion of Miles necessarily eviscerated Evans as well. 65 
D. United States v. Will 
This interpretation was confirmed in the 1980 case 
of United States v. Will,66 a case that has attracted more 
attention for its discussion of the propriety of the 
Supreme Court's addressing the merits of a lawsuit 
about judicial salaries than for its discussion of the 
Compensation Clause. In Will, the Court held that cer-
tain retroactive cancellations of scheduled cost-of-
living raises for federal judges violated the clause, even 
though the cancellation affected members of the other 
62Id. at 282. 
63Jd. 
64Id. at 282-83. 
65If Evans remained good law after O'Malley, the Compen-
sation Clause presumably would require the maintenance of 
the real, rather than the nominal, value of judicial salaries. 
But the Court of Claims, relying heavily on O'Malley, rejected 
this argument in a case brought by a group of Article Ill 
judges whose salaries had declined in real terms by 34.4 
percent over a six-year period. See Atkins v. United States, 556 
F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). 
66449 u.s. 200 (1980). 
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government branches as well.67 Despite the general 
character of the cancellations, the Court wrote that 
"[t]he inclusion in the freeze of other officials who are 
not protected by the Compensation Clause does not 
insulate a direct diminution in judges' salaries from the 
clear mandate of that Clause; the Constitution makes 
no exceptions for 'nondiscriminatory' reductions."68 
1. O'Malley and Evans. Although the extension of so-
cial security taxes to which Judge Hatter objects is also 
nondiscriminatory, Will doesn't help his position. Hat-
ter is challenging a reduction in his net pay, not his 
gross salary -:--- which was the issue in Will. In subject-
ing Article III judges to the taxes at issue in Hatter, 
Congress treated them the same way it treated high-
level officials of the legislative and executive branches 
and the same way that virtually all other citizens are 
treated. For this reason, the purposes of the Compen-
sation Clause aren't implicated in the case. As the Will 
Court presciently noted: "This is quite different from 
the situation in O'Malley .... There the Court held that 
the Compensation Clause was not offended by an in-
come tax levied on Article III judges as well as on other 
taxpayers; there was no discrimination against the 
plaintiff judge."69 Like Judge Woodrough, Judge Hatter 
is suffering no discrimination when compared with the 
rest of the American population and therefore noun-
constitutional diminution in salary: /iin O'Malley . .. 
this Court held that the immunity in the Compensation 
Clause would not extend to exempting judges from 
paying taxes, a duty shared by all citizens. The Court 
thus recognized that the Compensation Clause does 
not forbid everything that might adversely affect 
judges."70 
We hate to think that the judges are 
suggesting that their impartiality on 
the bench might be affected by their 
having been forced to become part of 
the social security system. 
If all of that isn't clear enough, the Will Court noted 
what had been apparent for decades- that O'Malley 
had left Evans staggering, even if not officially down 
for the count. Pointing to Justice Frankfurter's statement 
in O'Malley that "to the extent Miles v. Graham ... was 
inconsistent, it 'cannot survive,"' the Will Court noted 
the obvious: uBecause Miles relied on Evans v. Gore, 
67The Court upheld the prospective cancellation of other 
pay raises, finding no Compensation Clause violation in with-
holding from judges (as well as high-level executive officials 
and members of Congress) projected salary increases that had 
never taken effect. See id. at 229; see also Williams v. United 
States, 2001 WL 128053 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting Compensa-
tion Clause challenge to prospective cancellation of judicial 
pay raises). 
68Will, 449 U.S. at 226. 
69[d. 
70Id. at 227 n.31. 
TAX NOTES, March 12, 2001 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
O'Malley must also be read to undermine the reasoning 
of Evans . ... "71 
Yes, it must be read that way, and that's why 
Supreme Court jurisprudence doesn't support Judge 
Hatter's claim. 
2. Another rationale for the Compensation Clause? 
But perhaps we've been looking at the purpose of the 
Compensation Clause too narrowly. Maybe the clause 
furthers another goal, as the Court suggested in Will: 
This Court has recognized that the Compensation 
Clause also serves another, related purpose. As 
well as promoting judicial independence, it en-
sures a prospective judge that, in abandoning 
private practice - more often than not more 
lucrative than the bench- the compensation of 
the new post will not diminish. Beyond doubt, 
such assurance has served to attract able lawyers 
to the bench and thereby enhances the quality of 
justice.72 
While it's true that the Compensation Clause can have 
effects on recruiting, we're skeptical this was a "pur-
pose" of the clause at the founding. 73 But even if the 
clause can be justified as a way of making judicial 
service more attractive, this rationale doesn't apply to 
a tax that affects the population as a whole. If a poten-
tial judge is going to be subject to social security taxes 
whether he takes a judicial post or not, the quality of 
the judiciary shouldn't suffer because of the tax.74 
E. Interring Evans 
Since the Supreme Court has never explicitly over-
ruled Evans v. Gore, the Federal Circuit in Hatter con-
cluded that Evans was still good law.75 But that's wish-
ful thinking. Everything Justice Frankfurter said in 
O'Malley about the purposes of the Compensation 
Clause suggested that the intellectual foundation for 
Evans had been destroyed, as Will recognized. 
Frankfurter's failure to state explicitly that Evans had 
been overruled reflected judicial caution, nothing 
more. Evans and O'Malley can't both be the law. 
71[d. 
72Id. at 220-21 (citing Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920); 
1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 276 (1826)). 
73Removing the prohibition on increases in the first version 
of what became the Compensation Clause was certainly in-
tended to make attracting qualified judges easier, see supra 
text accompanying note 25, but that's not the same as saying 
the purpose of the clause was to help prospective judges 
resist the enticements of law practice. 
740£ course, eliminating taxes on the income of federal 
judges could be a backdoor way of increasing their real com-
pensation, and the argument has been made that Judge Hat-
ter should prevail precisely because higher compensation is 
needed to attract good people. As salaries for new law firm 
associates skyrocket, one can applaud the sentiment, but we 
shouldn't conflate policy arguments and the requirements of 
constitutional law. 
75 See 64 F.3d 647, 650 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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The absence of "the magic word 'overruled"'76 can't 
resurrect Evans. The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board 
of Education77 didn't expressly overrule Plessy v. Fer-
guson,78 either. The Brown Court simply "rejected" 
statements in Plessy that were contrary to "modern 
[psychological] authority"79 and "conclude[d] that in 
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate 
but equal' has no place."80 Nevertheless, many sub-
sequent cases have said that Brown really did overrule 
Plessy,81 and certainly everyone thinks that's what hap-
pened.82 Brown did to Plessy what O'Malley did to 
Evans. 
The Supreme Court's reluctance to overrule 
moribund precedents hasn't prevented lower courts 
from recognizing their lack of vitality. Perhaps the most 
notable example is Barnette v. West Virginia State Board 
of Education, 83 where the district court foresightedly 
declined to follow the two-year-old precedent of 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis84 because of 
evidence that the Supreme Court no longer regarded 
that ruling as sound but had not formally interred it.85 
In fact, several lower courts have remarked on the 
apparent demise of Evans v. Gore despite the Supreme 
76Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 
2000), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 22, 2000) (No. 00-455). 
77347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
78163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
79Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95. 
80Id. at 495. 
81See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 
(1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 
JJ.); id. at 960 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and 
Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 
191 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); 
Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing 
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 152 n.6 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133 (1970) 
82For example, the lower court in the case that led to the 
end of the Montgomery bus boycott was quite confident that 
Plessy hadn't survived Brown. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. 
Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), aff' d per curiam 
352 u.s. 903 (1956). 
8347 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (three-judge court), 
afj' d 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
84310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia St. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
85 See 47 F. Supp. at 253. For other examples of "an-
ticipatory overruling" by lower courts, see MargaretN. Knif-
fin, "Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Ac-
tion by United States Courts of Appeals," 51 Fordham L. Rev. 
53, 61-69 (1982). 
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Court's failure to repudiate it explicitly.86 It's perhaps 
understandable that the Federal Circuit has refused to 
treat Evans as a dead letter in light of the Supreme 
Court's recent insistence that lower courts follow all 
high court precedents, however fragile they might ap-
pear, until the justices~ themselves apply the coup de 
grace. 87 That's why the Court should take the oppor-
tunity presented in Hatter to overrule Evans once and 
for all. 
V. Conclusion 
The position taken by the federal judges prosecuting 
the Hatter case requires reading the Compensation 
Clause in a mindlessly literal way, and, even then, it's 
not the only literalist interpretation imaginable. 
("Compensation," as that term is used in many con-
texts, is not diminished by imposition of a tax. An 
income tax obviously affects after-tax income; it 
doesn't affect the level of salary paid by an employer 
to employee, at least not directly.) Certainly the judges' 
reading requires ignoring the primary purpose of the 
Compensation Clause, to protect judicial inde-
pendence. And we hate to think that the judges are 
suggesting that their impartiality on the bench might 
be affected by their having been forced to become part 
of the social security system. 
There's some superficial plausibility to the judges' 
claim because the legislation extending the social secu-
rity taxes to federal judges wasn't a statute of general 
application. It singled out government officials for the 
new, unhappy consequences. But it didn't single out 
the judiciary, a fact that should make some difference, 
and it effectively required only that federal judges be 
treated like other American citizens. If Congress could 
have included judges in the social security system to 
begin with, and we have no doubt on that score, surely 
Congress shouldn't be precluded from legislating to 
correct an earlier excess of caution. 
86See, e.g., Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (noting that the Court in O'Malley and Will "came 
as close to overruling [Evans] as it could without actually 
uttering the word"), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 22, 2000) (No. 
00-455); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1043 (Ct. CL 
1977) (en bane) (characterizing Evans as "no longer good law"), 
cert. denied 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); id. at 1044 (observing that 
O'Malley "by force of reasoning overruled a good deal of 
Evans"); id. at 1045 (referring to the "overruling" of Evans in 
O'Malley). 
87See Agostiniv. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997}; Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989). 
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In the March 12 issue of Tax Notes, we characterized 
United States v. Hatter, 1 which had been argued before 
the Supreme Court on February 20, as a slam-dunk 
case.2 Exhibiting the doubt-free perspective of law 
professors, we saw no good reason for the Court to 
strike down the extension of the old-age, survivors, 
and disability insurance (OASDI) tax and the Medicare 
tax to federal judges on the bench in 1983.3 By bringing 
judges into the social security system, Congress merely 
acted to subject judges to the same taxes applicable to 
the rest of us, or so we argued, not to diminish the 
judges' compensation in a way forbidden by the Com-
pensation Clause of the Constitution.4 Furthermore, we 
1The Court's opinion is at 121 S. Ct. 1782 (2001), Doc 2001-
14515 (33 original pages), 2001 TNT 99-8. 
2Jonathan L. Entin and Erik M. Jensen, "Taxation, Com-
pensation, and Judicial Independence: Hatter v. United 
States," Tax Notes, Mar. 12, 2001, p. 1541. 
3Before 1983, most federal employees, including judges, 
were exempt from social security taxes because of the retire-
ment systems established by the federal government on their 
behalf. But the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 subjected federal judges to the Medicare tax, Pub. L. No. 
97-248, tit. II, subtit. E, pt. III, section 278, 96 Stat. 324, 559-63 
(amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121), and tl-te Social Security 
Amendments of 1983 imposed the OASDI wage tax on the 
judges. Pub. L. No. 98-21, section 101(b)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 69 
(amending 26 U.S.C. section 3121). 
4The Compensation Clause provides that federal judges 
"shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compen-
sation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office." U.S. Const. art. III, section 1. 
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argued that Evans v. Gore,5 the 1920 Supreme Court case 
on which the Federal Circuit had relied in holding for 
the judges in Hatter, had been dead for more than 60 
years and deserved an official funeral. 6 
On May 21, the Court issued its decision in Hatter. 
Not surprisingly, the Court tossed the last shovelful of 
dirt on Evans's grave: "We now overrule Evans insofar 
as it holds that the Compensation Clause forbids Con-
gress to apply a generally applicable, nondis-
criminatory tax to the salaries of federal judges, 
whether or not they were appointed before enactment 
of the tax." 7 Also not surprisingly, the Court, over the 
dissents of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas, upheld the application of the Medicare tax to 
federal judges. But, to our surprise, the Court held that 
the extension of the OASDI tax to those judges sitting 
in 1983 was in fact discriminatory and, therefore, in-
valid under ·the Compensation Clause, even though 
Congress hadn't intended to single out the judiciary 
for unfavorable treatment. All seven participating jus-
tices (Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens 
were recused) thought the OASDI tax was constitution-
ally infirm as applied to Judge Hatter and other judges 
sitting in 1983.8 
We think that, given the purpose of the Compensa-
tion Clause, the Court got the OASDI issue wrong, as 
we'll demonstrate later. But in Part I we'll first explain 
the real -significance of Hatter - that it's now hard to 
imagine any realistic situation in which a federal taxing 
5253 u.s. 245 (1920). 
6The Court in Evans concluded that extending the income 
tax to federal judges violated the Compensation Clause, but 
Evans was eviscerated in 1939. See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 
U.S. 277 (1939); Entin and Jensen, supra note 2, at 1548. Be-
cause the Supreme Court hadn't explicitly overruled Evans, 
however, the Federal Circuit reasonably treated the case a·s if 
it had effect. See Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1790; Entin and Jensen, 
supra note 2, at 1550. 
7Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1790. Six of the seven participating 
justices voted to overturn Evans. In his opinion concurring 
on the OASDI tax issue but dissenting on the Medicare tax, 
Justice Scalia wrote, "The Court's decision today simply 
recognizes what should be obvious: that Evans has not only 
been undermined, but has in fact collapsed." Id. at 1798. Only 
Justice Thomas thought Evans was rightly decided. See infra 
notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
8The Court added that the infirmity of the tax wasn't cured 
by later increases in judicial compensation. Hatter, 121 S. Ct. 
at 1796-97. 
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statute could be deemed to violate the Compensation 
Clause. If we're right about that, the OASDI tax 
analysis, discussed in Part II of the article, is an his-
torical artifact; it matters to the judges involved, of 
course, but it will have no effect on the development 
of the law. 
I. Compensation and Taxation After Hatter 
The most important part of Hatter is the repudiation, 
once and for all, of the core of Evans v. Gore and the 
acceptance of the proposition that the Compensation 
Clause affects only those taxes that discriminate 
against the judiciary. The narrow holding involving the 
OASDI tax, which depended on a determination that 
there was discrimination, reflected a set of special facts 
that can't be duplicated, or even approached, in the 
future. The Compensation Clause should therefore 
never again have any serious effect on the national 
taxing power. 
As we argued in our first article, the Compensation 
Clause was part of the constitutional structure de-
signed to protect the judiciary against interference 
from other governmental branches, particularly Con-
gress. The concern was judicial independence, not 
preserving the economic positions of federal judges.9 
A tax of general application, one that isn't directed at 
the judiciary in general or at individual judges in par-
ticular, shouldn't implicate the clause. 
The Court's general pronouncements in Hatter are 
perfectly consistent with that understanding of the 
Compensation Clause. As Justice Stephen G. Breyer 
wrote for the Court, "In our view, the Clause does not 
prevent Congress from imposing a 'non-discriminatory 
tax laid generally' upon judges and other c~tizens, ... 
but it does prohibit taxation that singles out judges for 
specially unfavorable treatment."10 
When taxation is involved, the Compensation 
Clause analysis is therefore different from that used in 
examining congressional actions affecting judicial 
salaries. In 1980 the Court had decided, in United States 
v. Will, 11 that Congress may not reduce judicial salaries, 
even if done as part of a nondiscriminatory cost-cutting 
move. But, with taxation, the only concern is whether 
there has been discrimination against the judiciary in 
a way that might damage judicial independence. As 
Justice Breyer wrote in Hatter, 
[T]here is no good reason why a judge should not 
share the tax burdens borne by all citizens. We 
concede that this Court [in Will] has held that the 
Legislature cannot directly reduce judicial salaries 
even as part of an equitable effort to reduce all 
Government salaries .... But a tax law ... affects 
9See Entin and Jensen, supra note 2, at 1543-45. 
10Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1787 (quoting O'Malley v. Woodrough, 
307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939)). Five of tlie seven justices agreed 
with this proposition. Justices Scalia and Thomas both thir:k 
the Clause could forbid an increase in tax burdens that IS 
nondiscriminatory in nature. See infra notes 16-18 and accom-
panying text. 
11449 u.s. 200 (1980). 
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compensation indirectly, not directly .... [The] 
prophylactic considerations that may justify an 
absolute rule forbidding direct salary reductions 
are absent here . . . . In practice, the likelihood 
that a nondiscriminatory tax represents a dis-
guised legislative effort to influence the judic~al 
will is virtually nonexistent. Hence the potential 
threats to judicial independence that underlie the 
Constitution's compensation guarantee cannot 
justify a special judicial exemption from a com-
monly shared tax, not even as a preventive mea-
sure to counter those threats. 12 
We agree completely. Where we diffe~ with the 
Court is in its conclusion that the extenswn of the 
OASDI tax to sitting judges - the elimination of a tax 
exemption to which judges had been entitled - was 
in fact discriminatory. As we'll discuss in Part II, we're 
unconvinced that Congress "single[d] out judges for 
specially unfavorable treatment"13 in a way that should 
implicate the Compensation Clause. 
With Evans overruled, no longer can 
anyone seriously argue that federal 
judges are exempt from a generally 
applicable income tax or from, say, an 
increase in rates under a generally 
applicable income tax. 
But whatever the merits of the Court's consideration 
of the OASDI tax, that analysis should have no effect 
on the subsequent treatment of taxation under the 
Compensation Clause. A Hatter-like set of facts, involv-
ing the repeal of a tax exemption for f~d~ral judges, 
can't arise again: As far as we know, no s1~rular ~xemp­
tions remain on the books, and Congress IS unhkely to 
exempt federal judges from any other gen~rally ap-
plicable tax in the future. 14 Moreover, as J~shce Brey.er 
noted in Hatter, the likelihood that a facially nondis-
criminatory tax could represent an attack on the 
judiciary is "virtually nonexistent."15 As a result, a 
federal income tax could raise Compensation Clause 
12Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1792 (citations omitted). In our first 
article we noted that the Court had yet to decide whether a 
facially neutral statute motivated by a c.ongres~ion~l intent 
to influence the judiciary could ever fml constltu honal re-
quirements. See Entin and Jensen, supra note 2, at 1543 n.6 
(citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 n.30 (1980)). The 
quoted language from Hatter seems to resolve that issue, at 
least for taxing statutes. 
13Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1787. Justice Scalia thinks that dis-
crimination is unnecessary to invalidate a tax under the Com-
pensation Clause, see infra note 16, and Justic~ T~wmas 
apparently thinks that any ir:come ta:x unconstitutiOnally 
diminishes judicial compensation. See mfra notes 17-18 and 
accompanying text. 
14We doubt there would be political support for such an 
exemption to begin with, and the result in H~tter, ma~i~g it 
difficult for Congress to get rid of an exemptw~ once It s on 
the books, is an additional deterrent to creatmg any new 
exemption. 
15 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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issues after Hatter only if Congress were to target the 
tax (or part of the tax) at federal judges. Such a dis-
criminatory tax makes for a nice classroom hypotheti-
cal, but it's not a real world possibility.l6 
With Evans overruled, no longer can anyone serious-
ly argue that federal judges are exempt from a general-
ly applicable income tax or from, say, an increase in 
rates under a generally applicable income tax. Al-
though Justice Thomas, in a two-sentence opinion, 
wrote that the "Court was correct in Evans v. Gore ... 
when it held that any tax that reduces a judge's net 
compensation violates Article III of the Constitution,"17 
that statement is far removed from the common under-
standing of the last 60 years.18 
II. The OASDI Tax Analysis 
As we've suggested, the Court's analysis of the 
OASDI tax is unlikely to have significance for the 
development of the law. But it's still worth explaining 
why we think the Court's position isn't persuasive. 
The difficulty with the extension of the OASDI tax 
to federal judges, concluded the Court, was that the 
extension did in fact discriminate against the judges. 
We'll explain below that the Court's conclusion places 
Congress in a kind of Catch-22: Judges were the main 
targets of the 1983 OASDI extension in part because 
the Court itself had suggested that Congress couldn't 
apply the OASDI tax to the federal judiciary when the 
Social Security Act was passed in 1935. Even without 
that problem, though, the Court's reasoning is ques-
tionable. 
The conclusion that the extension of the OASDI tax 
discriminated against federal judges resulted from a 
complicated, four-step analysis presented by Justice 
Breyer. First, because of retirement plans already in 
place, federal employees had been outside the social 
security system before enactment of the 1983 changes. 
Second, the 1983 changes in fact didn't increase the 
16Justice Scalia's position also appears to be irrelevant to 
future analysis. Scalia criticized the Court's emphasis on dis-
crimination, which the Compensation Clause doesn't men-
tion. Instead, he would seek to determine whether a tax 
exemption has become part of judges' "compensation." Hat-
ter, 121 S. Ct. at 1798. If so, the exemption couldn't be 
eliminated for sitting judges, whether or not discrimination 
against the judiciary is involved. Moreover, Scalia deter-
mined that "a tax-free status conditioned on federal employ-
ment is compensation," id. at 1799, leading to his conclusion 
that the imposition of the Medicare tax on sitting judges was 
impermissible. But since judges no longer have sudi "com-
rensatory" tax exemptions, none of this should matter for 
the future. 
17Id. at 1800 (citation omitted). 
18In the context of Hatter, that position meant only that 
Justice Thomas thought the Medicare tax should have been 
struck down as well as the OASDI tax. But the implications 
of Justice Thomas's statement are astonishing. He seems to 
be suggesting that federal judges are constitutionally exempt 
from all income tax obligations. One of us (Jensen) has 
originalist leanings, but ev.en he thinks the idea that the 
Compensation Clause bars application of a tax of general 
application to federal judges is totally inconsistent with the 
original purpose of the Clause. 
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financial obligations of nearly all (96 percent) federal 
employees in office at that time because those em-
ployees were given the choice whether to enter the 
social security system or not.19 While in form the 
remaining 4 percent of the federal employees seemed 
to have no such choice, it was in fact only the federal 
judges and a few insignificant other offi~ials (like the 
president)2° - people whose government retirement 
plans were noncontributory - who were hurt finan-
cially by the 1983 changes in the law. 21 Third, the 
federal judges had to pay more, and got nothing in 
return. Because of pre-judicial employment, nearly all 
were already fully insured under the social security 
system. Finally, said the Court, the changes didn't 
serve to "'equaliz[e]' the retirement-related obligations 
that pre-1983law imposed upon judges with the retire-
ment-related obligations that pre-1983 law imposed 
upon other current high-level federal employees." 22 
To put the argument more simply: federal judges, 
and (with an exception or two) only federal judges, had 
increased tax obligations from the 1983 changes, with 
no compensating benefits. That's discriminatory and 
therefore inconsistent with the Compensation Clause. 
We're not convinced. The Court's analysis required 
a lengthy series of steps, and suppositions, to come to 
the determination that the statutory effects were dis-
criminatory. The level of detail required to conclude 
that the Compensation Clause was violated was ex-
traordinary when, as Justice· Breyer noted, there was 
no evidence whatsoever that Congress was acting to 
single out the judiciary for unfortunate consequences, 
and the effect·of the legislation was merely to bring the 
judiciary into the broadly applicable social security 
system. It's true that sitting judges were harmed eco-
nomically by the 1983 changes, but we don't see how 
judicial independence was implicated by these con-
gressional actions. 
Justice Breyer supplied a response to that criticism, 
but it was totally unsatisfactory. He suggested that if 
19Newly hired employees were given no such choice. 
20The President's pension is noncontributory .... And 
the President himself, like the judges, is protected 
against diminution in his "[c]ompensation." ... These 
facts may help establish congressional good faith. But, 
as we have said, we do not doubt that good faith. And 
we do not see why, otherwise, the separate and special 
example of that single individual, the President, 
should make a crucial difference here. 
Hatter, 121 S. Ct. at 1796 (citations omitted). That single in-
dividual indeed! 
21The retirement plan for judges is noncontributory, wrote 
Justice Breyer, because the Constitution permits judges to 
"draw a salary for life simply by continuing to serve .... That 
fact means that a contributory system, irt all likelihood, 
would not work." Id. at 1794 (citation omitted). That 
likelihood, said Breyer, gave a constitutional dimension to 
the plan arrangements: "The 1983 statute consequently 
singles out judges for adverse treatment solely because of a 
feature required by the Constitution to preserve judicial in-
dependence." Id. Whatever the difficulties with a contrib-
utory plan, we don't see how a noncontributory plan is 
"required" by the Constitution. 
22Jd. 
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the rules were otherwise, Congress could secretly 
punish the judges while professing high-minded goals: 
The Government also argues that there is no 
evidence here that Congress singled out judges 
for special treatment in order to intimidate, in-
fluence, or punish them. But this Court has never 
insisted upon such evidence. To require it is to 
invite legislative efforts that embody, but lack 
evidence of, some such intent, engendering 
suspicion among the branches and consequently 
undermining that mutual respect that the Con-
stitution demands .... Nothing in the record dis-
closes anything other than benign congressional 
motives. If the Compensation Clause is to offer 
meaningful protection, however, we cannot limit 
that protection to instances in which the Legisla-
ture manifests, say, direct hostility to the 
Judiciary. 23 
The posited concern about a vast congressional con-
spiracy is hard to take seriously. It's inconceivable that 
Congress - a group of 535 very independent, very 
voluble people - could ever take an action motivated 
by such hostility without leaving traces along the way. 
Judicial independence wasn't affected one whit by the 
1983 changes, and that should have been enough to 
decide the case.24 
At a more fundamental level, the Court's elaborate 
analysis of the OASDI tax issue ignores the context in 
which Congress was legislating. Now that Hatter has 
been decided, we know that the OASDI tax could con-
stitutionally have been imposed on federal judges at 
the same time it was imposed on other Americans. 
Judicial income can be reached by a generally ap-
plicable, nondiscriminatory tax, and the OASDI tax 
could have been structured in a nondiscr:iminatory 
way. But the long shadow of Evans v. Gore perhaps 
helps to explain why federal judges were exempted 
from the OASDI tax when the Social Security Act was 
23Id. at 1795-96 (citations omitted). 
24We understand that the Court continues to insist that the 
Compensation Clause serves a function in addition to fur-
thering judicial independence: 
Evans properly added that these guarantees of compen-
sation and life tenure exist, "not to benefit the judges," 
but "as a limitation imposed in the public interest." 
... They "promote the public weal," ... in part by 
helping to induce "learned" men and women "to quit 
the lucrative pursuits" of the private sector, ... but 
more importantly by helping to secure an inde-
pendence of mind and spirit necessary if judges are "to 
maintain that nice adjustment between individual 
rights and governmental powers which constitutes 
political liberty .... " 
Id. at 1791 (quoting Evans, 253 U.S. at 253, 248; 1 James Kent, 
Commentaries on American Law *294; and Woodrow Wilson, Con-
stitutional Government in the United States 143 (1911)). We'll have 
more to say about this Compensation-Clause-as-recruitment-
perk rationale in another . forum. Suffice it to say for present 
purposes that we don't think that the Clause was originally 
intended to convince well-to-do lawyers to forgo their "lucrative 
pursuits," and, original understanding aside, we don't want a 
federal bench made up of people who subordinate public ser-
vice to the desire for economic gain. See also Entin and Jensen, 
supra note 2, at 1549. 
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adopted: Evans strongly suggested that extending this 
new tax to sitting judges, like the extension of the in-
come tax to the judiciary that was rejected in 1920, 
would have run afoul of the Compensation Clause.25 
Hatter seems to mean that after Congress forwent 
the opportunity to tax jtldges, it was stuck with that 
result. Already sitting judges were entitled to the bene-
fit of the exemption for the rest of their judicial lives; 
taking the exemption away would have been dis-
criminatory. That's a difficult result to justify. In a very 
real sense, the Court was responsible for the exemption 
that it now says Congress couldn't eliminate with0ut 
affecting judicial independence. 
III. Conclusion 
The congressional taxing power is very broad, 
despite the specific limitations on that power contained 
on the Constitution. For many years, the Compensation 
Clause was considered such a limitation, and, in fact, 
the Supreme Court used the Clause in Hatter to strike 
down one exercise of the taxing power affecting the 
federal judiciary. But that specific result in Hatter is 
misleading. The real significance of Hatter is this: With 
the explicit (and long overdue) repudiation of Evans v. 
Gore, we should now be able to forget about the Com-
pensation Clause as a limitation on the taxing power. 
25When the social security system was developed, the 
Court hadn't yet expressed doubt about Evans. It wasn't until 
1939 that the Court eviscerated Evans without overruling it. 
See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). 
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